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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 15/05/2006 Accident number: 140 
Accident time: not recorded Accident Date: 23/10/1997 




Primary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA 
Organisation: Name removed  




Date record created: 13/02/2004 Date  last modified: 13/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
inadequate equipment (?) 
handtool may have increased injury (?) 
partner's failure to "control" (?) 
request for better PPE (?) 
request for long handtool (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
1 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
 
Accident report 
At the time of the accident the UN MAC in Afghanistan favoured the use of two-man teams 
(usually operating a one-man drill). The two would take it in turns for one to work on 
vegetation cutting, detecting and excavation, while the other both rested and supposedly 
"controlled" his partner. 
An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made briefly 
available. The following summarises its content.  
The victim had last attended a revision course one month before, and had last been on leave 
16 days before the accident. The group claimed to have found fragments to prove that the 
device involved was a PMN. The ground being worked on was described as "agricultural, 
medium hard". [A photograph showed flat clay, dry with sparse grasses.]  
The investigators decided that the victim was working with the detector and got a reading. He 
placed one mark and squatted to prod without wearing his helmet correctly. His bayonet was 
“destroyed” in the accident. 
The team Sub-Commander said the ground was very "stiff" which may have made the 
deminer exert too much pressure. He said they should be allowed to use the pick in these 
circumstances to reduce likelihood of injury. [This is interpreted as a request for a long 
handtool.] 
The Section Leader said the deminer was prodding properly but the ground was hard so he 
used too much force. He said that it would be safer to use a pick. 
The victim's partner said that the victim only placed one mark on the reading, and that the 
"stiffness" of the ground made him apply too much pressure. He said the pick would be safer 
because prodding with the bayonet was hazardous. He also said the visor of the helmet was 
impossible to see through. 
The victim said that this mine was deeper than the 11 mines he had found just before so he 
thought it was a fragment. He was working properly but was careless. He said it would be 
safer to use a pick and that the visor he was issued was impossible to see through. 
 
Conclusion 
The investigators concluded that the victim did not use the correct marking procedure, did not 
use his detector properly and did not use his helmet [and visor] properly. Also the victim 
squatted and prodded at the wrong angle. They found that the command and control 
exercised was poor to allow the above to happen. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that prodding should never be done in the squatting position 
when the ground is suitable for the prone position. Also that deminers should have the need 
to wear the helmet properly stressed and that disciplinary action should be taken against the 
Section Leader for his poor command and control. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 180 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
2 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Helmet 
Thin, short visor 
Protection used: Helmet 
 










See medical report. 
Medical report 
The victim's injuries were summarised as serious injuries to both eyes and his right hand. The 
left eye was lost (left corneal scleral perforation – upper lid laceration) and the right eye 
seriously injured. The victim reported injury to his right ear, right hand and "head impulses". 
A medic's sketch (reproduced below) showed right forearm and facial injuries. 
 
The demining group submitted an insurance report on 2nd March 1998, listing the injuries as a 
left eye total loss, right eye 75% disability; facial disfigurement; right ear drum 20% disability 
and multiple wounds on his body. 
In a compensation claim made later, his injuries were listed as loss of his left eye, injury to his 
right eye, multiple injuries to his face, laceration of his right arm and "mild" head injury.  





The primary cause of this accident is a listed as a "Management control inadequacy" because 
the visor was too damaged to see through properly (as was seen frequently by the researcher 
during field visits in 1998,99), which represents a serious management failing.  Whether that 
inadequacy lies with the demining group of the UN MAC is a moot point, with both blaming 
the other for failure to replace inadequate equipment in 1998 and the UN MAC belatedly 
recognising some responsibility in 1999. The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate 
equipment”. 
The use of the squatting position to "excavate" was in breach of UN requirements, but not in 
breach of the demining group's unauthorised variations to those requirements. The failure of 
the UN MAC to either listen to field feedback and adapt the SOP for local conditions, or 
enforce their own standards may be seen as further management failings. 
The agency that was used to make investigations for the UN MAC (based in Pakistan) at this 
time was frequently constrained by lack of funds, staff and transport. At times their movement 
was constrained by safety concerns. As a result, investigations were frequently delayed by 
weeks, meaning that an assessment of the site at the time of the accident was impossible.  
Gathering of further accident and medical treatment detail was prevented by the UN 
programme manager who denied all access to records in September 1999. Access has 
continued to be denied up to the date of completion of this version of the database. 
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